Abstract: Using the case of Buchanan v. Babco, the paper argues that multi-lingual settings are particularly apt for disclosing underlying cognitive and reasoning tasks that lawyers have to perform when interpreting a statute. It shows how approaches developed in computer science to model the way in which conflicting ontologies or worldviews are merged and inconsistencies between them repaired.
relevant skill that a lawyer must acquire, and therefore also task a legal AI should aim to replicate.
Early legal expert systems and legal AIs frequently were rule-based systems that translated statutory provisions more or less directly into a logical programming language such as PROLOG.
1 Despite their simplicity, for the right type of application they did result in useful tools; for instance, administrative "back office" applications that automate certain forms of low-level legal decision making, such as completeness and consistency checking of tax returns filed online; calculating the right level of social security benefits owed under social security law; 2 or helping with complex but repetitive compliance tasks. 3 In these applications, we typically have clear and often very technical legal rules with unambiguous antecedents ("do you earn more than £30,000 annually" or "does your company employ more than 50 workers"), and in a significant number of the cases it will encounter, the 1 For a historical overview, see Bench-Capon et al. "A history of AI and Law in 50 papers: 25 years of the international conference on AI and Law" Artificial Intelligence and Law 20, no. 3 (2012) : 215-319. For an example of an early rule-based system that modelled a part of UK statute law, see For a specific example that models statutory provisions in an early AI, see e.g. Sergot, Cory, Hammond, Kowalski, Kriwaczek, and Sadri "Formalisation of the British Nationality Act" International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 2, no. 1 (1986) : 40-52. 2 For an early discussion see e.g. Bench-Capon, Robinson, Routen, and Sergot "Logic programming for large scale applications in law: A formalisation of supplementary benefit legislation." In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, pp. 190-198, ACM, 1987. 3 See e.g Breaux, Vail, and Anton "Towards regulatory compliance: Extracting rights and obligations to align requirements with regulations." In Requirements Engineering, 14th IEEE International Conference, pp. 49-58, IEEE, 2006. application to the fact situation is unproblematic and only involves the core meaning of the operative legal terms. The added value of implementing them as a computer expert system lies in the speed with which these systems can operate and the fact that they do not get bored or distracted by repetitive tasks. However, the amount of legal intelligence that they represent is minuscule, and they typically deal with tasks that have previously been dealt with by paralegals or similar support and administrative staff. Most of the "heavy lifting", from a legal reasoning perspective, is done during the development stage when programmers (together with legal experts) extract appropriate rules from the statute(s) of interest, turn them into machine-readable format and in doing so also fix their meaning.
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This translation process from natural language statutory text to machine-readable formalism often hides crucial interpretative choices that are made by the knowledge engineer. The software user thus encounters the law already in its sanitised, disambiguated form. While this delivers useful results for selected applications, many more demanding legal tasks require an explicit reasoning about the meaning of legal norms.
One approach sometimes found in argumentation support systems is simply to add rules of statutory interpretation to the rule base of the system. For example, rules of the form 'If two laws contradict each other, then chose the one that was enacted later to decide the case' could serve as an approximation of the lex posterior derogat legi priori rule of statutory interpretation. However, in this translation process too something important gets lost. From the perspective of the computer programme, this rule is not categorically different from any other primary legal rule, e.g. the rule that 'if a single bank transaction is worth more than £10,000 then carry out a money laundering risk assessment'. The 'aboutness' of canons of interpretation, their nature as meta-rules that talk about the other rules in a system, gets lost; and "legal norms" become just one other object in the universe of discourse of the formal system: not different from (say) houses, knifes or contracts. With that, many of the cognitive tasks that a lawyer has to perform to interpret a statute are again pushed outside the system and remain a responsibility of the user. In the mini-example above, the user -rather than the legal AI -has to make the determination that there is indeed a conflict between the two rules as interpreted.
A more promising approach soon emerged which combined rule-based systems with case-based reasoners. This reflects a common legal practice: if in doubt what a legal term means, going back to a 'Cases and Materials' textbook -or consulting a commentary that links the statutory provision to the cases decided under it -is, of course, an important problem-solving strategy. However, the dominance of this approach in the field of legal AI cannot be explained only by it matching actual legal practice. It owes a great deal to the success that case-based reasoning, including machine learning, had in general artificial intelligence research. 5 In hybrid rule-based and case-based legal expert systems then, ambiguous statutory terms are resolved with reference to 'past experience'; that is, the relevant case law (and one might speculate whether the predominance of this approach also reflects the predominance of common law based researchers in the legal AI field). 6 In this approach too some of the crucial cognitive tasks that a lawyer performs are lost. The expert system might correctly deduce that the legal rule 'If X is a vehicle, then X must not enter the park' is not triggered when, in the case in question, the 'vehicle' is a children's toy:
because in all precedent cases in the knowledge-base of the system, the rule was only triggered in cases where the vehicle was of considerable size and was never triggered when it was a toy. 7 But the reasoning that informed these precedents -the cognitive tasks that the judges performed in the precedent cases -will not normally be represented. The difference between precedent-based and statute-based reasoning gets lost, and what makes certain forms of reasoning genuinely and uniquely legal is eclipsed in favour of a more abstract approach to human intelligence and problem solving.
Recently, however, there has been renewed interest from AI and law researchers in a computational approach to statutory interpretation that renders the reasoning process explicit -and maintains at the same time its distinctiveness as a cognitive-legal meta task.
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This paper contributes to this research strand but differs in two crucial regards. First, it aims at a much more fine-grained analysis of legal reasoning than the approaches by Araszkiewicz or Sartor and collaborators. The units of analysis, for them, are argumentation schemes and the ways these are played out in reasoning tasks. By contrast, the analysis here will focus on the internal logical structure of rules of interpretation and their interaction with primary norms; our interest is less in what types of argument are used,
and more in what cognitive tasks the judges had to perform to enable them to give reasons for their decision. Consequently, whilst they take as their input legal theories and doctrines about statutory interpretation, the starting point here is a specific legal case and the reasoning that the judges carry out to resolve it. In this sense, the hope is to complement the abstract, top-down and deductive approach of these authors with an inductive, bottomup case study approach.
Secondly, the case that is analyzed here is of a somewhat unusual nature. At stake is the interpretation of an international norm which is expressed authoritatively in English and French. This may seem unduly ambitious: if it is already difficult to develop a formal account of statutory interpretation within a legal system, surely, the much rarer and less well understood interpretation of a bilingual legal instrument by domestic courts may seem a step too far. 9 However, there are pedagogical and methodological advantages in taking multi-lingual decisions as a starting point for analysis. First, using bilingual texts forces us to observe the difference between the outward syntactical structure of a legal statute and its underlying semantics or meaning. For models of legal interpretation, this is a crucial distinction. We need to be able to express ideas such as that "Knifes are offensive weapons" This presents us with the challenge of given a formal account of reasoning in multijurisdiction systems that captures both aspects of foreign language sources: stabilising and coherence-increasing; destabilising and change-enabling. This paper will discuss several different ways in which such a model can be achieved.
Buchanan v Babco
I will use, in this paper, one specific case: James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd.
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The facts of the case are as follows: Babco Forwarding & Shipping ("Babco") entered into a contract with James Buchanan & Co ("JBC") for the carriage of 1,000 cases of whisky from Glasgow to Iran. Babco collected the whisky from a bonded warehouse in Glasgow, loaded it on to a trailer, and sent it on its way to Felixstowe for shipment. On its way from Glasgow to that port the trailer was taken to a lorry park in North Woolwich.
There it was left for the week-end. When the lorry driver came to collect the whisky-laden trailer after the weekend he found it had been stolen.
Whisky intended for export is exempt from UK excise duty and, therefore, no such duty had been paid on it. However, as it had been stolen, JBC became liable to pay excise duty (in the amount of £30,000) on it -the presumption now being that the thieves would sell it in the UK (and it would be consumed there). 13 The contract of carriage incorporated the terms and conditions stated in the "Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road" -the English and French versions of which were equally authoritative. 14 Now, a potential ambiguity in the Convention arises when the value of the goods is calculated. The English version of Article 23 of the Convention, so far as material, reads as follows: "1. When, under the provisions of this Convention, a carrier is liable for compensation in respect of total or partial loss of goods, such compensation shall be calculated by reference to the value of the goods at the place and time at which they were accepted for carriage.
2.
The value of the goods shall be fixed according to the commodity exchange price or, if there is no such price, according to the current market price or, if there is no 13 The relevant legislation is section 85 of the Customs and Excise Act 1952. 14 However, the Convention had been incorporated into domestic law by the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 -which gave legal force to the English language version only (in the Schedule to the Act).
commodity exchange price or current market price, by reference to the normal value of goods of the same kind and quality ...
4.
In addition, the carriage charges, customs duties and other charges incurred in respect of the carriage of the goods shall be refunded in full in case of total loss and in proportion to the loss sustained in case of partial loss, but no further damages shall be payable ..."
The legal issue that arose is: what was the value of the whisky "at the place and time" it was "accepted for carriage" i.e. the warehouse in Glasgow? It was agreed that there was no "commodity exchange price". Was there a "current market price" (or "normal value")?
If so, was it £37,000, (including the excise duty) or £7,000 (excluding it)?
This brings us to the bilingual nature of the operative law. Initially, Master Jacob, who assessed the damages, formed the opinion that the value of the whisky when it was taken out of the warehouse included the hypothetical excise duty that could have been levied on it (i.e. £37,000). Any other construction would mean, he said, that there were two artificial values existing side by side, one with and one without excise duty. This is in itself an interesting (onto)logical argument that will have to be taken into account later.
Lord Denning M.R., when the case reached the Court of Appeal, found that the phrase "the value of the goods at the place and time at which they were accepted for carriage" in Article 23 (1) In the arguments of those judges who think use of the foreign text is legitimate we find two interesting features. The first is matter of linguistics. The way in which the judges introduce French law, syntactically, is through quotation marks; these can form terms, which then, in turn, can be subject of predication. This enables us to 'talk about' language using language -in a reflexive mode. In this process, the semantic role of the quoted words can change.
As an illustration, the word "snow" plays a different semantic role, contributes to the truth of the sentence in which it occurs, in very different ways in: a) Snow is white; b) "Snow is white" and "Schnee ist Weiss" have the same meaning; and c) "Snow is white" is a well-formed sentence that has exactly three words.
A complete formal account of the reasoning in our case needs to be able to track these different roles a term can play -and to preserve the difference in meaning that quotation marks introduce. to influential theories about legal reasoning. In this way, the hope is that we can learn more about the structure, range, and plausibility of these theories
Paraconsistency in multi-language statutory interpretation
As we have seen, the immediate problem that was posed in this case was to resolve apparent inconsistencies between different interpretations. Inconsistency arose on the one hand between different interpretations of the English version of the statute, and between the French and the English version.
Seen from the perspective of legal theory, Master Jacob is the most traditional of the judges involved in this case. The vision of a legal system that models his reasoning is, in an important respect, essentially Dworkinian -the path-dependency of English law must not be derailed by external influences, the chain novel can and should be continued using UK law alone. His system is both normatively and cognitively closed; 26 no exchange takes place, but consistency is maintained. Denning M.R. and Roskill L.J., by contrast, are cognitively open to the influence of foreign law. However, Roskill L.J.'s approach stays normatively closed -the potential "irritant"of the foreign language version of the law is to be interpreted using common law methodology only and thus made compatible with the 26 In the terminology of system theory, see e.g. Luhmann, Niklas "Operational closure and structural coupling: the differentiation of the legal system." Cardozo L. Rev. 13 (1991) focus was on the logic of discourse: in a debate, a participant proposes positions or beliefs that (if sincere) are true according to the participant. The beliefs will be self-consistent, as a bare minimum, yet will often be inconsistent with those of the opponent. To model the discourse from the sum of its constituent parts, Jaśkowski formalised this in the form of a discursive logic, with a 'possible worlds' semantics. If someone asserts a sentence A in a discourse, they are (from their internal perspective) expressing an unequivocal commitment to the truth of A, e.g. 'The normal value of the whisky is £37,000'. From the perspective of the discourse, however, this is interpreted as the much weaker "it is possible that A" (◊A). As external observers of the court's deliberations we take the message that, depending on the chosen approach to statutory interpretation, the value of the whisky is possibly £37,000 -but also possibly only £7,000. This allows for the translation of sentences of the new discursive logic into the language of modal logic (typically S5). A then holds true in a discourse iff A is true in some possible world of the set of all possible worlds M over which S5 is interpreted. And, since A may hold true in one world but be false in another, both A and ¬A (not-A) may hold true in one and the same discourse.
There is something intuitively appealing about this approach in legal contexts.
Legal adjudication is a dialogical process. Not only that -when it comes to high level, precedent-setting adjudication in appeal cases, it is almost inevitably the case that both sides will be able to make good arguments for their respective positions; if one position were obviously untenable, the case would have been terminated long ago. If, then, the very best judges disagree amongst themselves in their respective speeches too, it seems inevitable to conclude that the various interpretations are (at the very least) all possible;
though eventually one may turn out to be more plausible than the others. So whilst, "from the inside", every party's monologue argues that its interpretation A is true; from the outside, the perspective of the dialogue, what they've really argued is just that their interpretation is possible -and they may even realise that this holds true for the other side as well (though they may not admit to that explicitly). It is precisely this transition from the inside perspective of the discussants to the outside perspective of the dialogue, or legal system, that Jaśkowski's logic is based on.
The idea that "worldviews" or belief systems will typically be internally coherent, but mutually inconsistent -so that every formal representation that models talking about several such systems needs to be able to handle inconsistencies -has been developed, for instance, by Batens (1998) . 32 However, his research also shows the limitations of a 32 Batens, D. "Dynamic semantics applied to inconsistency-adaptive logics." Logical Investigations 5 (1998):
74-85. paraconsistent analysis; both formally and from a philosophical perspective. Whilst it allows us, on the object-level of the formal language, to tolerate inconsistencies and to represent them, they disappear, on the meta-level, and become indices to possible worlds.
So whilst we can formally represent the statements 'Babco owes £37,000 and not £7,000'
and 'Babco owes £7,000 and not £37,000' -in the language of discourse logic -their meaning -seen from a meta-language perspective -simply becomes 'there is a world (a legal system) in which Babco owes £37,000 and a different world (legal system) where it owes only £7,000'. But, of course, we could have achieved the same in the object language and stayed within the formal framework of classical logic -by talking explicitly about jurisdictions or interpretations. The statements: 'Interpreted within the French legal system, Babco owes £37,000 and not £7,000' and 'Interpreted within the common law system, Babco owes £7,000 and not £37,000" are, of course, consistent with each other. So, whilst paraconsistent logics allow us to give a formal computational account of the issue under debate, it tells us much less about how the conflict is to be resolved.
Ontology repair and context semantics 33
The approach sketched out above emphasises the importance of logic, argumentation and reasoning in statutory interpretation and legal decision-making. A somewhat different approach is to focus less on the linguistic features and more on the type of objects that a theory or argument are 'about' -the ontology, rather than the logic, of a system. From a computer science perspective, an ontology is "an explicit specification of Crucially, what we encounter here is not necessarily a fixed set of rules of interpretation;
rather, the rules themselves may change in the process of their application when the system encounters a problem in the form of an inconsistency.
Similar processes are tackled by system engineers in artificial intelligence research.
A computer system may receive an input that is inconsistent with its knowledge base.
Rather than having a logical explosion, the system tries to repair itself -making the necessary modifications autonomously. For this, it needs to reason also about the very process of repairing itself; making notions such as 'context' explicit. Ontology matching and ontology repair has been an active research field in computer science and AI research for the last decade; with several important insights on the way in which agents from different (social, cultural, historical) backgrounds manage to realign their respective worldviews and, in this way, evolve their theories about the physical world. the resulting formalisms to the evolution of a legal doctrine, we can begin to understand the similarities and dissimilarities between interpretation of scientific laws by human researchers and interpretation of statutory laws by judges, lawyers and others.
To transfer the ideas from computational 'ontology matching and repair' to our legal example would require a formal ontology representation of the two putative objects, the French and the English "value of the goods" (one with excise duty as a necessary part, the other without), valid in their respective contexts, and then formalise the meta-reasoning that compares, matches and ultimately combines (repairs) the two.
I will now sketch very briefly and cursorily how one specific approach within the field of ontology repair, 'context logic', can capture the type of reasoning that we found in This principle we mention only to then (partly) violate it. One of the potential problems of the paraconsistent approach (outlined above) is that it preserves the inconsistencies but prevents conflict between them. In multi-context logics we have instead a fundamental assumption that repair is possible: that, at least temporarily, consistency and stability can be achieved. To do this, these logics view 'context' as a set of interacting formal theories; each with its own language, semantics and axiomatic system. Relations between contexts are represented as interaction between theories. The fact that these theories each have their own language makes them particularly suitable for issues such as that in Buchanan v Babco -something traditional logic, which takes place in the 'heaven of propositions' independent of any specific natural language, can't replicate.
As we discussed above, in a classical logical approach to modelling the logician would rely on the legal expert to give 'the' logical structure of the relevant piece of international law -thus preempting (to a degree) the legal debate on which version to use; this has to precede any attempt to model the reasoning by the court. By contrast, multi- The Giunchiglia (or "Trento") model of context is based upon the idea of a multicontext (MC) system. 40 These systems are based upon similar intuitions to the McCarthy model of context but, rather than introducing an "ist" predicate, they use context as part of the meta-logic and introduce "bridge rules" to enable inter-context reasoning. This difference also means that contexts and bridge rules are not object-language objects in a MC system; so we can't reason about them explicitly -which was one of the desiderata when the paper discussed the way in which the judges use quotation marks in their reasoning. This is the reason why, below, we will combine this approach with McCarthy's.
A context consists of a logical language (e.g. first-order logic), a set of axioms in this language (e.g. the rules of English law) and a set of inference rules. The notation c : F is used to express that 'formula F is true in context c'. Reasoning between contexts is done using bridge rules -rules whose premises and conclusion belong to different contexts. In what follows, the paper will use the Trento notation c : p to indicate that proposition p is true in context c. However, we use the McCarthy approach to contexts; so that contexts can be treated as first-class objects within the logic. This is crucial to making explicit the reasoning of the judges. The notation c : p should be considered shorthand for the assertion ist(c; p).
A 'legal-system context', then, defines the rules that govern the reasoning and procedures within a given legal system. These rules place constraints upon how lawyers can behave in a case within that legal system. Here we can see how our approach allows us to preserve the fact that, even though they may have identical meaning, there are two natural language versions of the Convention:
one in French and one in English. In classical logic, this could not be expressed; as terms with identical meaning get assigned identical formal representations.
We can now try to formalise the interpretative argument for the proposition that it is acceptable to consult the French version of the convention. This fourth axiom is designed to express the idea of resolving uncertainties in the interpretation of the domestic law that enacts an international treaty by reference to more determinate interpretations in other language versions of that treaty.
Eventually, we would want to derive from these axioms the following claim:
act : include ("othercharges′′,excise) but this would require a more extensive formalisation of the arguments than is possible here.
We could then try to formalise the argument that we are permitted to use the European methods of interpretation when consulting the English text; for example:
4. that we should use this purposive interpretation to resolve an issue of open texture in the phrasing of an Act.
We could also try to formalise the argument that we can use the European methods when interpreting a foreign case for the purpose of (in the context of) disambiguating domestic law.
Conclusion
I've been able to give only a broad outline of how we might produce a formal analysis of Buchanan v. Babco that is capable of replication on a computer yet still preserves all those feature of the argument that are interesting for a theory of statutory interpretation. There are nonetheless several lessons that can be drawn from our analysis so far. First, using examples from multi-lingual statutory interpretation did, as we had hoped for, bring to the surface many more of the cognitive operations that lawyers have to carry out when interpreting a statute. Secondly, doing justice to the way in which lawyers reason about statutory interpretation forced us to go beyond classical logic, -and to amend our formal vocabulary considerably. This was (also) caused by a self-reflexive process: court decisions like Buchanan v Babco involve simultaneously reasoning about primary legislation, using tools of statutory interpretation, and about the adequacy of these tools themselves (which may, in the process, change those tools). Thirdly, whilst statutory interpretation is therefore different from other legal reasoning tasks, the underlying structure showed clear similarities to the way in which contested theories in the natural sciences evolve, adjust and resolve inconsistencies between them. Crucial for this process was the ability to keep conflicting models of the text in the mind simultaneously, for a certain time at least, and then resolving the inconsistency by matching, merging and repairing these models. Syntactic models of legal argumentation alone cannot capture this process adequately; rather, we need to look at the way law 'creates realities' -made possible in our approach through a focus on the semantic interpretation of terms within a modal setting. For a theory of legal statutory interpretation, the insights that the formal approach brings are the recognition of the similarity to other, non-legal, reasoning tasks (and with that the ability to bring results of other disciplines to bear for future studies) and also the way in which certain interpretative choices (and commitments to theories of interpretation) interact with each other. For the future, the aim would be to give a more comprehensive account of the reasoning in a number of choice cases -to test the adequacy of the approach suggested here.
In the semi-formal approach of this paper, certain background assumptions remained implicit -making it, at this stage, not possible to fully replicate the reasoning by a software agent. Just how much these assumptions to are amenable to computational representation would give an indication just where, in legal reasoning, an irreducible human element is needed.
